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We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the per-
spective of whether aggregate judgments manage to eﬃciently use all voters’ private in-
formation. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a
different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters’ disagree-
ments stem from conﬂicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies
of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private
information underlying voters’ judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true
collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which
voting rules eﬃciently use all private information. We ﬁnd that in certain, but not all cases
a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the pro-
portion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular quota.
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
1. Introduction
In the by now well-established theory of judgment aggregation, a group needs to form a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ judgment on
different issues, based on the judgments of the group members on these issues. For instance, the jury in a court trial might
need to form a judgment on whether the defendant has broken the contract, and whether the contract is legally valid; the
United Nations security council might need to form a judgment on whether country X is threatened by a military coup,
and whether the economy of country X is collapsing; and so on. Group judgments matter in practice. They may determine
group action: in the court trial example, they may determine whether the defendant is convicted, and in the United Nations
example they may determine whether a large-scale international intervention in country X will happen.
So far, nearly the entire judgment aggregation theory follows the classical social-choice theoretic approach of aiming
to ﬁnd out how – and whether – group judgments can reﬂect the individuals’ judgments in a procedurally fair manner,
where ‘fair’ is spelled out in terms of axiomatic conditions on the aggregation rule (such as the anonymity condition or
the Pareto-type condition of respecting unanimous judgments). The recent Symposium on Judgment Aggregation in Journal
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state of the art of the theory, which we review below. This approach is certainly important in many contexts. The judgment
aggregation literature so far, however, has paid only little attention to a different ‘epistemic’ approach of aiming to track
the truth, i.e., reach true group judgments. The theory does not model the private information underlying voters’ judgments,
thereby preventing itself from studying questions of eﬃcient information aggregation. Yet such an epistemic perspective
seems particularly natural in the context of aggregating judgments (rather than preferences1). In our court trial example,
the ultimate goal seems indeed to be to ﬁnd out independent facts (of whether the defendant has broken the contract
and whether the contract is legally valid). So, the jury’s voting rule should be optimized with respect to the goal that the
resulting group judgments are true, not that they are fair to the jurors.
This alters the problem of designing the voting rule. Properties of voting rules standardly assumed in judgment aggrega-
tion theory, such as respecting unanimous judgments or anonymity, cannot be taken for granted anymore. If they turn out to
be justiﬁed, they derive their justiﬁcation from the truth-tracking goal rather than fairness considerations. To illustrate the
contrast, suppose each juror expresses the judgment (opinion) that the contract was broken. A collective ‘broken’ judgment
would then of course count as good from the classical social-choice theoretic perspective of procedural fairness. However,
from a truth-tracking perspective, much depends on questions such as whether the jurors’ judgments are suﬃcient evidence
for breach of contract, and whether voters have expressed their judgments truthfully.
This paper analyzes judgment aggregation from the truth-tracking and strategic-voting perspective. We model voters’
private information, which allows us to ask questions about eﬃcient information aggregation and strategic voting in a
Bayesian voting game setting. Though new within judgment aggregation theory, the modeling of private information is
well-established in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives, which started with seminal work
by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) and can be placed in the broader context of
work on the Condorcet Jury Theorem (see the review below). In the base-line case, voters share a common interest of
ﬁnding out the ‘correct’ alternative, but hold possibly conﬂicting private information about which of the alternatives might
be ‘correct’. The voting rule should be designed so as to help ﬁnding the ‘correct’ alternative by making optimal use of all
the private information scattered across the voters. So, the goal is eﬃcient information aggregation. Such an ‘epistemic’ binary
collective choice problem can in fact be viewed as a special judgment aggregation problem, involving just one issue. Our
court trial example involves two issues: ﬁrstly, whether the contract was broken, and secondly, whether it is legally valid. If
instead only the ﬁrst issue were on the jury’s agenda, the jury would face a single-issue judgment aggregation problem, or
equivalently, a binary collective choice problem. The entire machinery and results of the mentioned binary collective choice
literature could then be applied in order to design the voting rule.
This paper therefore combines insights from two largely disconnected ﬁelds, namely judgment aggregation theory and
binary collective choice with common interests. Independently, Ahn and Oliveros (2011) and DeClippel and Eliaz (2011)
take a similar approach, but ask different questions, as reviewed below. The two bodies of literature can learn from each
other. Indeed, judgment aggregation theory can beneﬁt from methodologies developed in the theory of binary collective
choice with common interests, while the latter theory can in turn beneﬁt from an extension beyond single-issue agendas
towards more complex agendas with multiple issues. Analyzing this multi-issue case does not reduce to analyzing each
issue separately, since preferences establish links between different issues.
It is worth starting simple. This paper therefore assumes that the group faces an agenda with just two issues, the simplest
kind of multi-issue agenda; but many of our results generalize easily, as discussed in Appendix A. Though simple, agendas
with just two issues are important in practice. Our court trial example and United Nations example each involve two issues.
To mention further two-issue agendas, a medical commission might need to issue joint judgments on whether a therapy is
effective, and whether it is compatible with given ethical standards; members of a political party in charge of elaborating
the party programme might seek joint judgments on whether a tax cut is affordable, and whether it is popular; a university
hiring committee might seek joint judgments on whether a given candidate is good at research, and whether he or she is
good at teaching; and ﬁnally, economic advisors to a government during the banking crisis in 2008 might need to issue
collective judgments on whether a given bank has short-term liquidity problems, and whether it has long-term liquidity
problems.
The issues of an agenda could in principle be mutually interconnected, so that the judgments taken on the issues
logically constrain each other; for instance, a ‘no’ judgment on all issues might be inconsistent. Indeed, interconnections
are what render judgment aggregation non-trivial if the usual social-choice theoretic approach of procedural fairness is
taken.2 However, within our truth-tracking approach, designing the voting rule is non-trivial even if the issues are mutually
independent. We therefore assume independence between issues (see Bozbay, 2012 for follow-up work on the case of
interconnected issues).
Structure of the paper Section 2 introduces our model, in which voters vote on the basis of private information and are
guided by ‘truth-tracking preferences’, i.e., aim for true collective judgments. Section 3 addresses the key question of how
1 In preference aggregation theory, the core of social choice theory, an epistemic perspective would be less natural since there is no objectively ‘true
preference’ to be found.
2 In the absence of interconnections one can safely aggregate by taking a separate vote on each issue. This never generates inconsistent collective
judgments and meets all standard social-choice theoretic requirements such as anonymity.
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equilibrium. It will turn out that in certain, but not all cases one should use a ‘quota rule’, which decides on each issue
according to whether the number of ‘yes’ judgments on the issue exceeds a particular quota. The details depend on the
exact kind of truth-tracking preferences. For certain preferences, the only voting rule which induces an eﬃcient and truthful
Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a quota rule with particular thresholds. For certain other preferences, there is an entire class
of such voting rules, including non-monotonic ones. Section 4 analyzes the notion of truthful behavior, by determining
the conditions under which a ‘sincere’ voter directly reveals his information in his vote. In Appendix A, we consider the
generalization of our framework and part of results from two to an arbitrary number m  2 of issues. This links us to the
traditional literature on jury theorems that emerges as the special case of m = 1 issue. Finally, Appendix B contains all
proofs.
Literature review We now selectively review the two bodies of literature to which this paper connects, beginning with
judgment aggregation theory. As mentioned, this theory’s primary objective has so far been to ﬁnd out which voting rules
can aggregate the judgments of group members over some issues in accordance with certain axiomatic requirements with a
classic social-choice theoretic ﬂavor, such as unanimity preservation (the counterpart of the Pareto principle) and independence
(the counterpart of Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives). A series of possibility and impossibility results address
this query, by giving answers which depend, ﬁrstly, on the axiomatic requirements on the voting rule, and secondly, on the
agenda of issues under consideration (e.g., List and Pettit, 2002; Dietrich 2006, 2007, 2010; Nehring and Puppe 2008, 2010;
Dietrich and List 2007a, 2008; Dokow and Holzman 2010a, 2010b; Dietrich and Mongin, 2010; see also precursor results
by Guilbaud, 1952 and Wilson, 1975; for an introductory overview see List and Polak, 2010). By contrast, a small minority
of papers about judgment aggregation take a truth-tracking perspective (e.g., Bovens and Rabinowicz, 2006; List, 2005 and
Pivato, 2011). Their innovation is to apply the classical Condorcet Jury Theorem to judgment aggregation. Despite taking
a truth-tracking perspective, they have little in common with our work, since private information and strategic incentives
are not being considered.3 List and Pettit (2011) provide the most systematic philosophical analysis of the truth-tracking
approach, already discussing strategic incentives and private information and drawing on the second body of literature to
which we now turn.
As for this second body of literature, it is concerned with voting rules for binary choice problems in which disagreements
are driven (partly or totally) by conﬂicting information rather than conﬂicting interests. Speciﬁcally, the utilities which voters
derive from decisions are affected by the same unknown ‘state of the world’, about which voters hold private information.4
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1997) show that it typically cannot be rational for all vot-
ers to vote sincerely, and that the choice of voting rule matters considerably for sincere voting and eﬃcient information
aggregation. While the former authors consider the ‘purely epistemic’ case without conﬂict of interest, the latter authors
introduce some preference heterogeneity (and focus primarily on large electorates). Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2005,
2006) add an extra dimension of pre-voting deliberation. Duggan and Martinelli (2001) extend the approach to continuous
rather than binary private information. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), Coughlan (2000) and Gerardi (2000) examine
the (in)effectiveness of unanimity rule in ‘protecting the innocent’ in jury trials. Goertz and Maniquet (2011) analyze ef-
ﬁcient information aggregation in large electorates, showing that approval voting outperforms other voting rules in their
setting.
Like us (and independently from us), Ahn and Oliveros (2011) and DeClippel and Eliaz (2011) also combine these two
aggregation problems by studying elections on multiple binary issues with common preferences and asymmetric informa-
tion. Each of these papers compares two voting procedures. Ahn and Oliveros (2011) compare resolving each issue by a
majority vote among all voters with resolving each issue by a majority vote among a subgroup assigned to this issue (where
the subgroups for different issues are disjoint and equally large). They show that neither of these procedures is generally
more eﬃcient than the other one if the group is large enough. DeClippel and Eliaz (2011) consider a group choice between
two possible actions (such as convicting or acquitting the defendant), where the ‘optimal’ action depends on two or more
issues/criteria, and where each voter holds private information on each issue (possibly with correlations across issue). They
compare premise-based voting with conclusion-based voting. Under the former, a vote is taken on each issue, and the out-
comes determine the group action (conclusion). Under the latter, the group votes directly on which action to take, without
forming a group view on the issues. They show that premise-based voting is more eﬃcient than conclusion-based voting,
but that the difference vanishes asymptotically as the group size increases. These two works are important advances, into
directions different from our work which is not concerned with comparisons of ﬁxed mechanisms but with the design of
eﬃcient mechanisms.
3 Dietrich and List (2007b) analyze strategic voting in judgment aggregation, but in a sense not relevant to us since strategic voting is not modeled as
coming from private information and a voter is motivated by the somewhat different goal that the collective judgments match his own judgments. Such
assumptions are more natural under common knowledge of each other’s judgments than under informational asymmetry. See also related work by Nehring
and Puppe (2002, 2007).
4 This contrasts with the scenario of private values of, but common information about, alternatives. Such elections lead to somewhat different Bayesian
games. While the case of two alternatives is trivial, a multi-alternative analysis is given by Ahn and Oliveros (2012).
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2.1. A simple judgment aggregation problem
We consider a group of voters, labeled i = 1, . . . ,n, where n  2. This group needs a collective judgment on whether
some proposition p or its negation p¯ is true, and whether some other proposition q or its negation q¯ is true. In our court
trial example, p states that the contract was broken, and q that it is legally valid; in our job candidate example, p states
that the candidate is good at research, and q that he or she is good at teaching; and so on for our other examples. The
four possible judgment sets are {p,q}, {p, q¯}, {p¯,q} and {p¯, q¯}; we abbreviate them by pq, pq¯, p¯q and p¯q¯, respectively.
For instance, pq¯ means accepting p but not q. Each voter votes for a judgment set in J = {pq, pq¯, p¯q, p¯q¯}. After all voters
cast their votes, a collective decision in J is taken using a voting rule. Formally, a voting rule is a function f : J n → J ,
mapping each voting proﬁle v = (v1, . . . , vn) to a decision d ≡ f (v). Among the various voting rules, quota rules stand out
as particularly natural and common. A quota rule is given by two thresholds mp,mq ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n + 1}, and for each voting
proﬁle it accepts p [q] if and only if at least mp [mq] voters accept it in the proﬁle. Quota rules have three salient properties:
• Anonymity: For all voting proﬁles (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ J n and all permutations (i1, . . . , in) of the voters, f (vi1 , . . . , vin ) =
f (v1, . . . , vn). Informally, the voters are treated equally.
• Monotonicity: For all voting proﬁles v,v′ ∈ J n , if for each r in f (v) the voters who accept r in v also accept r in v′ ,
then f (v′) = f (v). Informally, additional support for the collectively accepted propositions never reverses the collective
acceptance of these propositions.
• Independence: The decision on each proposition r ∈ {p,q} only depends on the votes on r.5 Informally, the group in
effect takes two separate votes, one between p and p¯ and one between q and q¯.
Remark 1. A voting rule f :J n →J is a quota rule if and only if it is anonymous, monotonic and independent.
We brieﬂy sketch the proof of the non-trivial direction of implication. As can be shown, if a voting rule f : J n → J is
anonymous and independent, then it is given by two sets Mp,Mq ⊆ {0,1, . . . ,n}, in the sense that for each voting proﬁle
v ∈ J n the decision f (v) contains r (∈ {p,q}) if and only if the number of votes in v containing r belongs to Mr . If f is
moreover monotonic, each set Mr can be shown to take the form {mr,mr +1, . . . ,n} for some threshold mr ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n+1}.
Clearly, f is the quota rule with thresholds mp and mq .
2.2. A common preference for true collective judgments
Exactly one judgment set in J is ‘correct’, i.e., contains propositions which are factually true. It is called the state (of the
world) and is generically denoted by s. For instance, the state might be pq¯, so that p and q¯ are true (and p¯ and q are false).
Voters have identical preferences, captured by a common utility function u :J ×J →R which maps any decision-state pair
(d, s) to its utility u(d, s). Given voters’ truth-tracking goal, one would expect u(d, s) to be high if d = s, i.e., if the decision
is correct. But how exactly should u be speciﬁed? We focus on two natural kinds of preferences:
Simple preferences. Here, the utility function is given by
u(d, s) =
{
1 if d = s (correct decision)
0 if d = s (incorrect decision). (1)
Such preferences are the simplest candidate for truth-tracking preferences. Correct decisions are preferred to incorrect ones,
without further sophistication.
Consequentialist preferences. Here, we assume that the decision leads to one of two possible consequences, typically
representing group actions. This is captured by a consequence function Co which maps the set of possible decisions J to a
two-element set of possible consequences. The consequence function might look as follows in examples given earlier. In our
court trial example, the court decision pq leads to conviction, since both premises of guilt are found to be satisﬁed (Co(pq) =
‘conviction’), while the other decisions all lead to acquittal (Co(p¯q¯) = Co(pq¯) = Co(p¯q) = ‘acquittal’). In our job candidate
example, the decision pq leads to a hire since the candidate is seen as meeting both criteria (Co(pq) = ‘hire’), while the
other decisions all lead to no hire (Co(p¯q¯) = Co(pq¯) = Co(p¯q) = ‘no hire’). In our United Nations example, the decisions pq¯
and p¯q each lead to a large-scale international intervention in country X (Co(pq¯) = Co(p¯q) = ‘intervention’), whereas the
decisions pq and p¯q¯ both lead to no intervention since the United Nations then consider an intervention as being too risky
or unnecessary, respectively (Co(pq) = Co(p¯q¯) = ‘no intervention’). In our bank rescuing example, the decisions pq¯ and p¯q
5 Given a voting proﬁle v, the subproﬁle with respect to r is denoted vr (∈ {r, r¯}n), and the collective decision with respect to r is denoted fr(v) (∈ {r, r¯}).
Independence means that for all voting proﬁles v,v′ ∈J n , if vr = v′r , then fr(v) = fr(v′).
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lead to no rescue plan since a rescue is seen as infeasible or unnecessary, respectively (Co(pq) = Co(p¯q¯) = ‘no rescue’). The
consequentialist utility function is given by
u(d, s) =
{
1 if Co(d) = Co(s) (correct consequence)
0 if Co(d) = Co(s) (incorrect consequence). (2)
Incorrect decisions (d = s) can have correct consequences (Co(d) = Co(s)). The hiring committee might view the candidate as
good at research and bad at teaching when in fact the opposite is true, so that the resulting consequence (‘no hire’) is correct
for wrong reasons. This gives high utility under consequentialist preferences, but low utility under simple preferences.6
In the context of consequentialist preferences, one might wonder whether, given that all that counts is the consequence,
it would not suﬃce to aggregate the voters’ judgments on the consequence, ignoring judgments on the underlying issues –
leading to a simple group decision problem between two alternatives. This would amount to an informational loss: while a
voter’s judgment on the consequence (the ‘conclusion’) follows from his judgments on the two issues (the ‘premises’), the
latter cannot generally be retrieved from the former. The lost information is valuable information, since, as will turn out, the
eﬃcient group action (which is ‘found’ by an optimal aggregation rule) often makes full use of a voter’s judgments on the
issues, rather than using only the information of which action follows from these judgments. Put formally, given the votes
on the two issues v1, . . . , vn ∈ J n , an optimal aggregation rule f leads to the collective action Co( f (v1, . . . , vn)) which
depends on the submitted judgments v1, . . . , vn in such a way that not only the information of the resulting consequences
Co(v1), . . . ,Co(vn) is used. This suggests that voting directly on the consequence may lead to ineﬃcient group actions, and
that it is thus worth voting on the underlying issues.7
In real life, many groups vote only on the consequence/action: while the underlying issues/premises typically play a role
in the process of group deliberation and discussion prior to voting, the voting itself often only involves a simple yes/no
choice on the action. As mentioned, such a conclusion-based procedure can be criticized based on our analysis.
The empirical question of which real-life decision making bodies vote directly on the conclusion and which (as assumed
in this paper) vote on underlying issues is beyond the scope of this theoretical paper. In support of the real-life importance
of voting on underlying issues, let us merely mention that for some decision-making bodies – such as some criminal
courts, constitutional courts, central banks, or political organizations – it is desirable or even legally required to come up
with reasons or justiﬁcations for the actions which are implemented, for reasons of legitimacy and accountability of public
actions. In our terminology, the group needs a collective decision on the issues, not just a collective action/consequence. For
instance, many courts must publicly state not just whether they convict the defendant, but also on what grounds they do so,
which involves taking positions on multiple issues. See Kornhauser and Sager (1986) for public accountability of courts, and
Pettit (2001) and List and Pettit (2011) for accountability and legitimacy of political organizations.
2.3. Private information and strategies
If voters had not just common preferences, but also common information about what the state might be, then no
disagreement could arise. We however allow for informational asymmetry. Each voter has a type, representing private in-
formation or evidence.8 A voter’s type takes the form of an element of J , generically denoted by t . For instance, a voter
of type t = pq¯ has evidence for p and for q¯. We write t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ J n for a proﬁle of voters’ types. Nature draws a
state-types combination (s, t) ∈ J n+1 according to a probability measure denoted Pr. When a proposition r ∈ {p, p¯,q, q¯} is
meant to represent part of voter i’s type rather than part of the true state, we often write ri for r. For instance, Pr(pi |p) is
the probability that voter i has evidence for p given that p is true. By assumption, the prior probability that r (∈ {p, p¯,q, q¯})
is true is denoted
πr = Pr(r)
and belongs to (0,1), and the probability of getting evidence for r given that r is true is denoted
ar = Pr(ri |r),
6 In the judgment aggregation literature, the two possible consequences are often represented by two additional propositions, c and c¯, which are referred
to as ‘conclusion propositions’ in contrast to the ‘premise propositions’ p, p¯,q, q¯. In our ﬁrst two examples, the consequence function is encoded in the
biconditional c ↔ (p ∧ q), whereas in our last two examples it is encoded in the biconditional c ↔ ((p ∧ q) ∨ (p¯ ∧ q¯)).
7 A complete argument to the effect that conclusion-based voting is ineﬃcient also requires investigating the strategic incentives under the (different)
game form of the conclusion-based procedure. Such an argument is made by DeClippel and Eliaz (2011), albeit in a different framework. Rigorously
speaking, our results imply the ineﬃciency of the conclusion-based procedure only under the hypothesis that, under this procedure, a voter i votes for the
consequence Co(vi) which follows from his vote vi under the issue-based procedure. (A violation of this hypothesis would constitute a form of untruthful
voting, which could itself be viewed as a shortcoming of the conclusion-based procedure.)
8 The type could represent information that is not shared with other voters because of a lack of deliberation or limits of deliberation. More generally,
a voter i’s type could represent uncertainty of other voters about i’s beliefs.
576 I˙. Bozbay et al. / Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) 571–590belongs to (1/2,1), and does not depend on the voter i. The parameters ap,ap¯,aq,aq¯ measure the reliability of private
information, as they represent probabilities of receiving ‘truth-telling’ information. The lower bound of 1/2 reﬂects the
(standard) idea that information is more reliable than a fair coin.
By assumption, voters’ types are independent conditional on the state, and in addition the state and the types w.r.t. p are
independent of the state and the types w.r.t. q.9 These independence assumptions allow one to express the joint distribution
of the state and the types by just a few parameters, namely πp,πq,ap,ap¯,aq,aq¯ . For instance, the probability that the state
is pq and all voters receive the truth-telling evidence pq is
Pr(pq, p1q1, p2q2, . . . , pnqn) = Pr(pq)Pr(p1q1, p2q2, . . . , pnqn|pq) = πpπqanpanq .
Each voter submits a vote in J based on his type. A (voting) strategy is a function σ : J → J , mapping each type t ∈ J to
the type’s vote v = σ(t). We write σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) for a proﬁle of voters’ strategies. Together with a voting rule f and a
common utility function u, we now have a well-deﬁned Bayesian game.
For a given type proﬁle t ∈ J n , we call a decision d eﬃcient if it has maximal expected utility conditional on the full
information t.10 Some common notions of voting behavior can now be adapted to our framework:
• A strategy σ of a voter is informative if σ(t) = t for all types t . An informative voter directly reveals his information in
his vote.
• A strategy σ of a voter is sincere if for every type t , the vote σ(t) maximizes the expected utility conditional on the
information t . A sincere voter votes for the decision which maximizes the expected utility conditional on his type; so,
he acts as if his vote alone determined the decision, neglecting the other voters and their strategies. (Technically, this
amounts to optimal behavior in a hypothetical single-player decision problem.)
• A strategy proﬁle σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is eﬃcient if for every type proﬁle t = (t1, . . . , tn) the resulting decision d =
f (σ1(t1), . . . , σn(tn)) is eﬃcient (i.e., has maximal expected utility conditional on full information t). Hence, all the
information spread across the group is used eﬃciently: the collective decision is no worse than a decision of a (virtual)
social planner who has full information.
• A strategy proﬁle σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) is an equilibrium if it is a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding Bayesian game, i.e.,
if each strategy is a best response to the other strategies. In such a proﬁle, each voter maximizes the expected utility
of the collective decision given the strategies of the other voters. (In this maximization exercise, it turns out that a
voter must only consider cases in which his vote is pivotal. Under a quota rule with majority thresholds, a voter is for
instance pivotal if half of the other voters votes pq and the other half votes p¯q¯.)
While informativeness and sincerity are properties of a single strategy (or voter), eﬃciency refers to an entire proﬁle.
Finally, to avoid distraction by special cases, we make two assumptions. First, we exclude the degenerate case in which
some decision in J is not eﬃcient for any type proﬁle whatsoever. Second, we exclude eﬃciency ties, i.e., we exclude
those special parameter combinations such that some type proﬁle t leads to different eﬃcient decisions (with different
consequences when we assume consequentialist preferences).
3. Which voting rules lead to eﬃcient information aggregation?
3.1. Setting the stage
Our objective is to design the voting rule (‘mechanism’) in such a way as to yield eﬃcient decisions on the basis of
informative votes. In short, the voting rule should render informative voting eﬃcient.11 We begin by justifying this ob-
jective. Prima facie, two goals are of interest. The rule should, ﬁrstly, lead to eﬃcient outcomes, and, secondly, encourage
simple-minded, truthful behavior. By such behavior we mean informative voting.12 To reach the second goal, informative
voting should constitute an equilibrium. If additionally informative voting is eﬃcient, both goals are reached. So, the double
goal is that informative voting should be eﬃcient and form an equilibrium. By part (a) of the following theorem, whenever
informative voting is eﬃcient, it a fortiori deﬁnes an equilibrium – which explains our primary objective that informative
voting be eﬃcient.
Theorem 1. Consider an arbitrary common utility function u :J 2 →R.
(a) For any voting rule, if a strategy proﬁle is eﬃcient, then it is an equilibrium.
(b) There is an anonymous voting rule for which informative voting is eﬃcient (hence, an equilibrium).
9 Recall that the state consists of a proposition in {p, p¯} and another in {q, q¯}. The ﬁrst [second] of these propositions is what we call the state w.r.t. p
[q]. A voter’s type w.r.t. p [q] is deﬁned similarly.
10 I.e., d maximizes E(u(d, S)|t) =∑s∈J u(d, s)Pr(s|t), where ‘S ’ denotes the random variable generating the state s in J .
11 By saying “informative voting” without referring to a particular voter, we mean “informative voting by all voters”.
12 One might alternatively mean sincere voting – but in practice there is little difference, since informative and sincere voting coincide under reasonable
informational assumptions. As one can show, if informative voting is not sincere, then there exists a decision d ∈J such that no voter ever ﬁnds himself
in an informational position to consider d as best – a rather uninteresting, if not unnatural scenario.
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kind of (common) preferences. The converse of part (a) does not hold: for instance, under a constant voting rule all strategy
proﬁles are equilibria, typically without being eﬃcient. The message of part (b) is positive but so far vague: it is always
possible to make informative voting eﬃcient, but apart from anonymity we do not know anything about the kind of voting
rule we can use. And indeed, for some kinds of common preferences, it may not be possible to aggregate in an independent
or monotonic way (as counterexamples show). But, once we narrow down to simple or consequentialist preferences, can –
or even must – we aggregate in a monotonic resp. independent way? When can – or even must – we use a quota rule?
Such questions are answered below.
3.2. Simple preferences
This section addresses the case of simple preferences, given by the common utility function (1). Which rules render
informative voting eﬃcient? The answer is ‘simple’, as we will see. To state our result, we ﬁrst deﬁne two coeﬃcients13:
kp := min
{




















These coeﬃcients have an interpretation: as can be proved, for p [q] to be more probably true than false given all informa-
tion, at least kp [kq] individuals need to receive evidence for p [q], i.e., need to have a type containing p [q].
Theorem 2. Assume simple preferences. Informative voting is eﬃcient if and only if the voting rule is the quota rule with thresholds kp
and kq.
This result shows that the quota rule with thresholds kp and kq is the only rule we may use in view of making infor-
mative voting eﬃcient. This result is much more speciﬁc than the purely existential claim in part (b) of Theorem 1. This
progress was possible by focusing on simple preferences.
3.3. Consequentialist preferences: ﬁrst type
We now turn to consequentialist preferences. Much depends on the nature of the consequence function. In principle,
there exist 24 = 16 potential consequence functions from J to a binary set of consequences. But, as we shall see shortly,
there are only two non-degenerate consequence functions up to isomorphism. We therefore deﬁne two types of consequen-
tialist functions. Consequentialist preferences (or the consequence function) are said to be:
• of type 1 if Co(pq) = Co(p¯q¯) = Co(pq¯) = Co(p¯q);
• of type 2 if Co(pq) = Co(p¯q¯) = Co(pq¯) = Co(p¯q).
Our ﬁrst two examples of consequentialist preferences in Section 2.2 are of type 1, while our last two examples are of
type 2. But why are all non-degenerate consequence functions of one of these two types? Firstly, consequence functions for
which each decision in J has the same consequence are of course degenerate and therefore uninteresting. Also consequence
functions which depend only on the decision between p and p¯, or only on the decision between q and q¯, are degenerate,
since in this case we are essentially back to a decision problem with a single proposition-negation pair, which has already
been studied in the literature.14 The non-degenerate consequence functions are those which genuinely depend on both
propositions. Among all of them, some assign each consequence to exactly two decisions in J , while the others assign one
consequence to three decisions and the other consequence to just one decision. As one can show, the former consequence
functions are of type 1, while the latter are of type 2 up to isomorphism (i.e., up to exchanging p and p¯ and/or exchanging
q and q¯). Thus, by studying our two types of consequence functions, we will have covered non-degenerate consequentialist
preferences exhaustively.
We now address the ﬁrst type, while the next subsection turns to the second type. One might at ﬁrst expect there
to be little resemblance between the current preferences and simple preferences in terms of the appropriate voting rule.
For instance, even when all individuals have type pq, so that there is overwhelming evidence for state pq, the current
preferences allow us to eﬃciently decide for p¯q¯, since this decision has the same consequence as pq. Surprisingly, despite
13 The minimum deﬁning kp or kq should be interpreted as n + 1 if the set whose minimum is being taken is empty. In fact, emptiness is impossible
under simple preferences. This follows from our non-degeneracy assumption on the model parameters (which also implies that kp ,kq ∈ {1, . . . ,n}). Note
that in (3) and (4) the right hand side of the inequality is strictly decreasing in k.
14 For instance, our UN intervention example would be degenerate if the question of whether to intervene only depended on whether the country is
considered as being threatened by a military coup (p or p¯). The other pair of propositions (q or q¯) could then be eliminated from the voting process.
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preferences of type 2 in terms of the design of the voting rule. The coeﬃcients kp and kq , deﬁned earlier for simple
preferences, again play a key role.
Theorem 3. Assume consequentialist preferences of type 1. A voting rule makes informative voting eﬃcient and is monotonic if and
only if it is the quota rule with thresholds kp and kq.
So, as for simple preferences, the social planner is led to impose a quota rule with the particular thresholds kp and kq .
What distinguishes Theorem 3 from Theorem 2 is, for one, its somewhat different (and longer) proof, and secondly, the
additional monotonicity requirement. Without this extra condition, a number of other voting rules become possible.15
3.4. Consequentialist preferences: second type
We now turn to consequentialist preferences of type 2. The space of aggregation possibilities is somewhat different here.
As we shall show, quota rules are not always possible, and when they are, the two thresholds must be calculated differently.
For all k, l ∈R, we deﬁne the coeﬃcient
β(k, l) = πpa
k
p(1− ap)n−k




πqalq(1− aq)n−l + πq¯an−lq¯ (1− aq¯)l
. (5)
One can show that β(k, l) has a natural interpretation if k, l ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n}: it is the probability that the state is pq conditional
on having k times evidence for (and n − k times evidence against) p and l times evidence for (and n − l times evidence
against) q. So, β(k, l) = Pr(pq|t) for some (hence, any) type proﬁle t ∈J n containing p exactly k times and q exactly l times;
or equivalently,
β(k, l) = Pr(p|p1, . . . pk, p¯k+1, . . . , p¯n) × Pr(q|q1, . . . ,ql, q¯l+1, . . . , q¯n).
As one can prove by drawing on the deﬁnition of the consequence function, given a type proﬁle t containing p exactly k
times and q exactly l times, if β(k, l) > 1/2 then only the decision pq is eﬃcient, while otherwise the three other decisions
are all eﬃcient. This implies a ﬁrst, simple characterization result. Henceforth, the number of votes for a proposition r in a
voting proﬁle v is written nvr .
Proposition 1. Assume consequentialist preferences of type 2. A voting rule f makes informative voting eﬃcient if and only if for every
voting proﬁle v ∈J n the decision f (v) is pq if β(nvp,nvq) > 1/2 and in {pq¯, p¯q, p¯q¯} otherwise.
Which possibilities – if any – are left if we require the rule to be a quota rule? We begin by introducing two coeﬃcients.
Given that all voters hold evidence for q, how many voters with evidence for p does it minimally take for the decision pq
to become eﬃcient? Similarly, given that all voters hold evidence for p, how many voters with evidence for q does it take
for the decision pq to become eﬃcient? The answer to these questions is given by the following numbers, respectively16:
lp := min
{
k ∈ {0, . . . ,n}: β(k,n) > 1/2} (6)
lq := min
{
k ∈ {0, . . . ,n}: β(n,k) > 1/2}. (7)
Theorem 4. Assume consequentialist preferences of type 2. There exists a quota rule making informative voting eﬃcient if and only if
β(lp, lq) > 1/2. In this case, that quota rule is unique and has the thresholds lp and lq.
Unlike when preferences are simple or consequentialist of type 1, and unlike in the classic literature for a single pair of
propositions p, p¯, we have an impossibility:
Corollary 1. Assume consequentialist preferences of type 2. For some combinations of values of the model parameters (πp,πq,ap,ap¯,
aq,aq¯ and n), no quota rule makes informative voting eﬃcient.
For instance, if πp = πq = 0.5, ap = aq = ap¯ = aq¯ = 0.7 and n = 3, no quota rule makes informative voting eﬃcient,
whereas if instead πp = πq = 0.6, the quota rule with thresholds lp = lq = 2 makes informative voting eﬃcient.
15 For consequentialist preferences of type 1, one may show that a (possibly non-monotonic) voting rule f makes informative voting eﬃcient if and
only if for every voting proﬁle v ∈ J n the decision f (v) has the same consequence as the decision under the quota rule with thresholds kp and kq (i.e.,
Co ◦ f = Co ◦ g , where g is this quota rule). So, once we drop the monotonicity requirement, there is not just one possible voting rule, as for simple
preferences, but 24
n
possible rules (since there are 2 allowed decisions for each of the 4n proﬁles in J n).
16 These two minima are taken over non-empty sets of values of k (by the non-degeneracy assumption at the end of Section 2.3).
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While by Corollary 1 it may be utopian to aim for a full-ﬂedged quota rule, we now show that one can always achieve
two characteristic properties of quota rules, namely anonymity and monotonicity, while often losing the third characteristic
property, namely independence. Speciﬁcally, we characterize the class of all monotonic and anonymous (but not necessarily
independent) aggregation possibilities. As we shall see, this class consists of so-called quota rules ‘with exception’. Such
rules behave like a quota rule as long as the proﬁle does not fall into an ‘exception domain’, while generating the ‘exception
decision’ pq on the exception domain. Formally, we deﬁne quota rules with exception as follows:
A quota rule with exception f :J n →J is given by thresholds mp,mq ∈ {0, . . . ,n+ 1} and an ‘exception domain’ E ⊆J n ,
and is deﬁned as follows for all voting proﬁles v ∈J n:
• if v /∈ E then f (v) contains any proposition r in {p,q} if and only if nvr mr (as for a regular quota rule),• if v ∈ E then f (v) = pq.
Equivalently, for any r in {p,q},
f (v) contains r if and only if
[
nvr mr or v ∈ E
]
.17
Standard quota rules arise as special cases with an empty exception domain. In our characterization theorem, the exception
domain is E = {v: β(nvp,nvq) > 1/2}, so that
f (v) contains r ⇔ [nvr mr or β(nvp,nvq)> 1/2], for all r ∈ {p,q} and v ∈ J n. (8)
Theorem 5. Assume consequentialist preferences of type 2. A voting rule makes informative voting eﬃcient and is monotonic and
anonymous if and only if it is the quota rule with exception (8) for some thresholds mp,mq such that β(mp, lq), β(lp,mq) > 1/2.
Fig. 1 shows three voting rules of the kind given in Theorem 5. They differ in the choice of the thresholds mp and mq .
Fig. 1(a) shows the generic case. In Fig. 1(b), the thresholds are chosen in a maximal way, i.e., mp =mq = n+ 1. As a result,










for all voting proﬁles v ∈ J n . In Fig. 1(c), the thresholds are chosen in a minimal way. That is, mp is the minimal number
for which β(mp, lq) > 1/2; in short, mp is chosen such that β(mp, lq) ≈ 1/2, as illustrated by the ﬁgure. Similarly, mq is









q) 1/2 and β(nvp, lq) > 1/2
p¯q if β(nvp,n
v
q) 1/2 and β(lp,nvq) > 1/2
p¯q¯ otherwise.
(10)
17 The notion of a quota rule with exception could be generalized by allowing the exception decision to differ from pq. The exception decision is pq for
us due to the privileged status of pq under consequentialist preferences of type 2.
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such a quota rule exists.
4. When is informative voting sincere?
While the previous section focuses on designing a voting rule, the present section does not depend on the voting rule.
We focus on a single voter and answer the question of when informative voting is sincere, that is, when the naive strategy
of ‘following the evidence’ is worthwhile for a sincere voter. For each type of preference, we fully characterize the parameter
combinations for which this is so. We begin with simple preferences.





for each r ∈ {p,q}.
This result has an intuitive interpretation. We know that necessarily the upper bound ar¯1−ar for
πr
1−πr exceeds 1 and the
lower bound 1−ar¯ar is below 1, since ar,ar¯ > 1/2. For very high or very low values of the prior probabilities πr , the ratio
πr
1−πr
is far from 1, so that one of the bounds is violated and informative voting is not sincere. This makes sense since if voters
have ‘strong’ prior beliefs, then the evidence collected cannot overrule the prior beliefs: sincere votes cease to be sensitive
to evidence, i.e., depart from informative votes. By contrast, for less strong prior beliefs, the inequalities are satisﬁed, so that
informative voting is sincere, i.e., it is worth following the evidence as a sincere voter.
Another useful perspective on the result is obtained by focusing not on the parameters πr representing prior beliefs, but
on the parameters ar and ar¯ representing ‘strength of evidence’. The larger ar and ar¯ are (i.e., the ‘stronger’ private evidence
for r and r¯ is), the greater the upper bound for πr1−πr is and the smaller the lower bound is, which makes it easier to meet
both inequalities. In summary, suﬃciently strong evidence and/or suﬃciently weak prior beliefs imply that it is worth voting
informatively (‘following the evidence’) as a sincere voter.
Surprisingly, the characterization remains the same as we move from simple preferences to consequentialist preferences
of type 1 (though the proof is quite different):





for each r ∈ {p,q}.
One can interpret this result in a similar way as done for simple preferences.







































Theorem 8. Under consequentialist preferences of type 2, the informative voting strategy is sincere if and only if A, B  πp1−πp ×
πq
1−πq  C.
Although the characterizing inequalities are more complicated than for the previous two kinds of preference, an inter-
pretation in terms of strength of evidence is again possible. If the voter’s evidence is suﬃciently strong (i.e., if ap,ap¯,aq,aq¯
are suﬃciently close 1), then C is well below 1 and A and B are well above 1, so that the inequalities are likely to hold; as
a result, informative voting is sincere, i.e., it is worth following the evidence as a sincere voter.
Appendix A. Generalization to an arbitrary number of issues
We have so far considered a two-issue agenda. But many of our results generalize to an arbitrary number m ∈ {1,2,3, . . .}
of issues. Such a generalization is of obvious interest, ﬁrstly because it establishes the link with the traditional literature on
jury theorems, which considers m = 1 issue, and secondly because judgment aggregation theory rarely limits the size of the
agenda.
Let us be precise. Our results for simple preferences generalize smoothly to the m-issue case (where for m = 1 issue
we recover a key result by Austen-Smith and Banks, 1996). For consequentialist preferences, the picture becomes more
complicated, since the number and structural complexity of possible consequence functions grows rapidly with m, so that it
does not suﬃce to consider two types of consequentialist preferences. This is why, although our ﬁndings on consequentialist
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possible consequentialist preferences for m > 2 issues. For only m = 1 issue, however, there essentially exists only one type
of consequentialist preferences, which coincides with simple preferences. We therefore limit our present m-issue analysis to
the case of simple preferences, while leaving consequentialist preferences to future research.
We begin by generalizing our model. We consider a ﬁxed number m ∈ {1,2,3, . . .} of issues. For each issue j
(∈ {1,2, . . . ,m}), the group needs to form a collective judgment on whether a proposition p j or its negation p¯ j is true.
Each set {p∗1, . . . , p∗m}, which for any issue j contains a proposition p∗j from {p j, p¯ j}, is a possible judgment set. Let Jm be
the set of possible judgment sets for our m-issue agenda. (Note that if m = 2 then Jm is our earlier set J , with p1 = p and
p2 = q.) A voting rule f : J nm → Jm maps each voting proﬁle v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ J nm to a collective ‘decision’ d ≡ f (v) ∈ Jm .
A quota rule is a voting rule deﬁned by m thresholds hp1 , . . . ,hpm in {0,1, . . . ,n}, where, under any given voting proﬁle,
a proposition p j is accepted if and only if at least hp j voters accept it.
There is an objective fact as to which propositions are true and which false: exactly one (unknown) judgment set in Jm
is ‘correct’; it is referred to as the state and contains the ‘true’ propositions. Everyone aims for a correct collective decision.
Speciﬁcally, each voter holds the same preferences over decision-state pairs (d, s) ∈J 2m , given by a common utility function
u :J 2m →R. We focus on simple preferences, deﬁned by the utility function is given by
u(d, s) =
{
1 if d = s (correct decision)
0 if d = s (incorrect decision).
Each voter i receives a noisy private signal ti ∈Jm , his type; intuitively, it contains the propositions for which the voter holds
private evidence. A type proﬁle is a vector t = (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ J nm . Nature draws a state-types combination (s, t) ∈ Jm × J nm
according to a probability measure denoted Pr.
Just as in the two-issue case, one deﬁnes the notions of an eﬃcient decision given a type proﬁle, a (voting) strategy, an
informative strategy (or strategy proﬁle), a sincere strategy (or strategy proﬁle), an eﬃcient strategy proﬁle, and an equilibrium
strategy proﬁle.
When a proposition r ∈ {p1, p¯1, . . . , pm, p¯m} is meant to represent part of voter i’s type rather than part of the true state,
we often write ri for r. By assumption, the prior probability that r ∈ {p1, p¯1, . . . , pm, p¯m} is true is denoted
πr = Pr(r)
and belongs to (0,1), and the probability of getting evidence for r ∈ {p1, p¯1, . . . , pm, p¯m} given that r is true is denoted
ar = Pr(ri |r),
belongs to (1/2,1), and does not depend on the voter i. Further, voters’ types are independent conditional on the state,
and in addition the state and the types w.r.t. any proposition are independent of the state and the types w.r.t. any other
proposition. To avoid special cases, we exclude that some decision in Jm is not eﬃcient for any type proﬁle, and that some
type proﬁle leads to multiple eﬃcient decisions (i.e., an eﬃciency tie).
The following two Theorems for simple preferences in the m-issue case generalize Theorems 2 and 6 for the two-issue
case as well as classic results by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) for the one-issue case. We ﬁrst generalize our earlier
coeﬃcients ‘kp ’ and ‘kq ’. For each proposition p j in {p1, . . . , pm}, we deﬁne the coeﬃcient18
kp j := min
{










Interpretationally, for the proposition p j to be more probably true than false given a type proﬁle, p j must occur at least kp j
times in this type proﬁle.
Theorem 9. Under simple preferences, informative voting is eﬃcient if and only if the voting rule is the quota rule with thresholds
kp1 , . . . ,kpm .








j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Finally, Theorem 1 about an arbitrary kind of (common) preferences also generalizes to any number of issues. This
theorem continues to hold as stated, simply replacing ‘J ’ by ‘Jm ’.
18 Note that the minimum in (11) is taken over a non-empty set due to our non-degeneracy assumption.
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We begin by some preliminary derivations (Section B.1). We then prove the results of the main in a new order obtained
by clustering the results according to the kind of preferences (Sections B.2–B.5). We ﬁnally prove the results of Appendix A
(Section B.6).
Conventions. Recall the notation ‘ fr ’ introduced in fn. 5 and the notation ‘S ’ for the random variable generating the state s
in J introduced in fn. 10. Double-negations cancel each other out, i.e., p stands for p, and q for q. We refer to the two
technical assumptions made at the end of Section 2.3 as ‘non-degeneracy’ and ‘no eﬃciency ties’, respectively.
B.1. Preliminary derivations
The joint probability of a state-types vector (s, t) = (spsq, t1pt1q, . . . , tnptnq) ∈J n+1 is








where the last two equations follow from our independence assumptions. A voter’s probability of a state s = psqs ∈J given
his type t = ptqt ∈J is given by Pr(s|t) = Pr(ps|pt)Pr(qs|qt), which reduces to
Pr(s|t) = πpsaps
πpsaps + πps (1− aps )
× πqsaqs
πqsaqs + πqs(1− aqs )
if ps = pt,qs = qt (12)
Pr(s|t) = πpsaps
πpsaps + πps (1− aps )
× πqs (1− aqs )
πqs (1− aqs ) + πqsaqs
if ps = pt,qs = qt (13)
Pr(s|t) = πps (1− aps )
πps (1− aps ) + πpsaps
× πqsaqs
πqsaqs + πqs(1− aqs )
if ps = pt,qs = qt (14)
Pr(s|t) = πps (1− aps )
πps (1− aps ) + πpsaps
× πqs (1− aqs )
πqs (1− aqs ) + πqsaqs
if ps = pt,qs = qt (15)























Proof of Theorem1. (a) As mentioned, this part follows from McLennan (1998), but for completeness we include a proof. We
write Ti (= Tip Tiq) for the random variable generating voter i’s type in J , and T= (T1, . . . , Tn) for the random type proﬁle.
Consider any voting rule f : J n → J and any eﬃcient strategy proﬁle σ = (σ1, . . . , σn). To show that σ is an equilibrium,











)∣∣ti) E(u( f (vi,σ−i(T−i)), S)∣∣ti) for all vi ∈ J ,
where (σi(ti),σ−i(T−i)) and (vi,σ−i(T−i)) of course denote the voting proﬁles in which i votes vi resp. σi(ti) and each
j = i votes σ j(T j). To show this, note that for all vi ∈J ,


































= E(u( f (σi(ti),σ−i(T−i)), S)∣∣ti),
where the inequality holds because the strategy proﬁle (σi,σ−i) = σ is eﬃcient for the type proﬁle (ti, t−i) = t.
(b) Since by (16)–(19) the conditional distribution of the state given full information t ∈ J n depends on t only via the
numbers ntp and n
t
q , so does the conditional expected utility of each decision, and hence, the set of eﬃcient decisions. For
each (k, l) ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n}2, let F (k, l) ∈J be a decision that is eﬃcient for some (hence, every) t ∈J n for which ntp = k and
ntq = l. The voting rule f deﬁned by v → f (v) = F (nvp,nvq) is clearly anonymous and renders informative voting eﬃcient. 
B.3. Simple preferences
Although Theorems 2 and 6 about simple preferences are later generalized to the multi-issue case, we give direct proofs
of these theorems; this is helpful since the two-issue case is more concrete and elementary than the general m-issue case.
We begin by two lemmas.




)= Pr(S = d),
and the conditional expected utility of d given a type or a type proﬁle is given by the analogous expression with a conditional probability
instead of an unconditional one.
Proof. The claim follows immediately from the deﬁnition of the utility function. 
The next lemma invokes the coeﬃcients kp and kq deﬁned in (3) and (4).
Lemma 2. Assume simple preferences. For all type proﬁles t ∈ J n, all r ∈ {p,q}, and all decisions d,d′ ∈ J such that d but not d′




∣∣t)> E(u(d′, S)∣∣t) ⇔ ntr  kr .
Proof. Let t ∈ J n . We ﬁrst prove the equivalence for r = p, d = pq and d′ = p¯q. By the deﬁnition of kp , the inequality










which by (16) and (18) is equivalent to Pr(pq|t) > Pr(p¯q|t), and hence by Lemma 1 to E(u(pq, S)|t) > E(u(p¯q, S)|t). Next,
suppose r = p, d = pq¯ and d′ = p¯q¯. Using (17) and (19), the inequality (20) is equivalent to Pr(pq¯|t) > Pr(p¯q¯|t), and hence,
to E(u(pq¯, S)|t) > E(u(p¯q¯, S)|t). The proof for the remaining cases is analogous. 
We are now in a position to prove the two theorems about simple preferences.
Proof of Theorem 2. Consider a rule f :J n →J .
A. First, assume f is the quota rule with thresholds kp and kq . Consider a given type proﬁle t ∈ J n . Supposing that
voters vote informatively, the resulting voting proﬁle is v= t. We have to show that the decision d := f (v) is eﬃcient for t,
i.e., that (*) E(u(d, S)|t) > E(u(d′, S)|t) for all d′ ∈ J \{d}. (We use ‘>’ rather than ‘’ in (*) because of our ‘no eﬃciency
ties’ assumption.) The property (*) follows from Lemma 2. For instance, if d = pq, then by deﬁnition of f we have ntp  kp
and ntq  kq , so that Lemma 2 implies the inequality in (*) for d′ = p¯q and d′ = pq¯




∣∣t)> E(u(p¯q, S)∣∣t), E(u(pq¯, S)∣∣t)> E(u(p¯q¯, S)∣∣t),




∣∣t)> E(u(pq¯, S)∣∣t), E(u(p¯q, S)∣∣t)> E(u(pq, S)∣∣t),
which again implies (*).
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that (**) fr(v) = r ⇔ nvr  kr . Consider the type proﬁle t = v. Since informative voting is eﬃcient, the decision d = f (v) is
eﬃcient for t (= v), i.e., satisﬁes condition (*) above. Lemma 2 and (*) together imply (**). For instance, if f (v) = pq, then
(**) holds because, ﬁrstly, fr(v) = r, and secondly, nvr  kr by (*) and Lemma 2. 
Proof of Theorem 6. A. First, assume informative voting is sincere. Equivalently, for any given type t ∈ J , E(u(d, S)|t) is
maximal at d = t , i.e., by Lemma 1 (*) Pr(d|t) is maximal at d = t . Applying (*) to type t = pq, we have Pr(pq|t) Pr(p¯q|t),
which implies πp1−πp 
1−ap¯
ap





1−πp . We have shown both inequalities relating to p. The two inequalities relating to q can be
proved analogously.





for each r ∈ {p,q}. We consider any type t ∈ J and have to show that the decision
d = t has maximal expected utility given t , or equivalently, that (*) holds.
We show (*) ﬁrst in the case t = pq. Here, the inequality πp1−πp 
1−ap¯
ap
implies Pr(pq|t) Pr(p¯q|t) by (12) and (14), and
it implies Pr(pq¯|t) Pr(p¯q¯|t) by (13) and (15). Further, the inequality πq1−πq 
1−aq¯
aq
implies Pr(pq|t) Pr(pq¯|t) by (12) and
(13). This shows (*) for t = pq.
Now we show (*) for the case t = pq¯. As πp1−πp 
1−ap¯
ap
, we here have Pr(pq¯|t) Pr(p¯q¯|t) by (12) and (14), and we have
Pr(pq|t) Pr(p¯q|t) by (13) and (15). As aq¯1−aq 
πq
1−πq , we also have Pr(pq¯|t) Pr(pq|t) by (12) and (13). This proves (*) for
t = pq¯.
By similar arguments, one shows (*) for t = p¯q and for t = p¯q¯. 
B.4. Consequentialist preferences: type 1
We begin by two lemmas, which are the counterparts of Lemmas 1 and 2 for the current preferences.






Pr(pq) + Pr(p¯q¯) if d ∈ {pq, p¯q¯}
Pr(pq¯) + Pr(p¯q) if d ∈ {pq¯, p¯q},
and the conditional expected utility of d given a type or a type proﬁle is given by the analogous expression with conditional probabilities
instead of unconditional ones.
Proof. The claim follows easily from the deﬁnition of the utility function. 




∣∣t)> E(u(d′, S)∣∣t)⇔ [ntr  kr for both or no r ∈ {p,q}].
Proof. Consider any t ∈J n , d ∈ {pq, p¯q¯} and d′ ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}. Deﬁne gr(k) := πrakr (1−ar)n−k and gr¯(k) := (1−πr)(1−ar¯)kan−kr¯
for all r ∈ {p,q} and k ∈ R. For each r ∈ {p,q}, the deﬁnition of kr can now be rewritten as kr = min{k ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n + 1}:
gr(k) > gr¯(k)}. So, (*) for each k ∈ {0,1, . . . ,n + 1}, k kr ⇔ gr(k) > gr¯(k). (Here, the implication ‘⇒’ uses that gr(k) [gr¯(k)]













)+ gp¯(ntp)gq¯(ntq)> gp(ntp)gq¯(ntq)+ gp¯(ntp)gq(ntq) by (16)–(19)
⇔ [gp(ntp)− gp¯(ntp)][gq(ntq)− gq¯(ntq)]> 0
⇔ [ntr  kr for both or no r ∈ {p,q}] by (*). 
We can now prove our two theorems about the present preferences.
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider a rule f :J n →J .
A. Assume f is the quota rule with thresholds kp and kq . Firstly, f is monotonic. Secondly, to show that informa-
tive voting is eﬃcient, consider a given type proﬁle t ∈ J n . Supposing informative voting, the resulting voting proﬁle is
then v := t. We have to show that d := f (v) is eﬃcient for t, i.e., that for each d′ ∈ J with Co(d′) = Co(d) we have (*)
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by Lemma 4. If d = p¯q¯, then ntr  kr for no r ∈ {p,q}, again implying (*) by Lemma 4. Finally, if d is p¯q or pq¯, then ntr  kr
for exactly one r ∈ {p,q}, so that (*) holds once again by Lemma 4.
B. Conversely, assume f is monotonic and makes informative voting eﬃcient. We consider any v ∈ J n and must show
that (**) fr(v) = r ⇔ nvr  kr for each r ∈ {p,q}. As one can show using our non-degeneracy assumption,
kr /∈ {0,n + 1} for some r ∈ {p,q}; (21)
for instance, if kr were zero for each r ∈ {p,q}, then by Lemma 4 the decisions p¯q and pq¯ would be ineﬃcient for each type
proﬁle, violating non-degeneracy. We now prove (**) by distinguishing four cases.
Case 1: nvr  kr for each r ∈ {p,q}. We must show that f (v) = pq. Since the decision f (v) is eﬃcient for the type proﬁle
t = v, by Lemma 4, f (v) ∈ {pq, p¯q¯}. Suppose for a contradiction f (v) = p¯q¯. By (21), kr  1 for some r ∈ {p,q}. Suppose
kp > 0 (the case that kq > 0 being analogous). Let v′ be the voting proﬁle obtained from v by replacing each occurring p
by p¯. By monotonicity, the decision is f (v′) = p¯q¯. By Lemma 4, for the type proﬁle t′ = v′ only p¯q and pq¯ are eﬃcient since
nt
′
p = 0 < kp and nt′q = nvq  kq . So, the decision f (v′) (= p¯q¯) is ineﬃcient, a contradiction since f makes informative voting
eﬃcient.
Case 2: nvp  kp and nvq < kq . We must show that f (v) = pq¯. By Lemma 4, pq¯ and p¯q are both eﬃcient for the type
proﬁle t= v. So, as informative voting is eﬃcient, f (v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q}. Suppose for a contradiction f (v) = p¯q. By (21), kp > 0 or
kq  n. First, if kp > 0, deﬁne v′ as in Case 1. By monotonicity, the decision is f (v′) = p¯q, which is ineﬃcient for the type
proﬁle t′ = v′ by Lemma 4 as nt′p = 0 < kp and nt′q = nvq < kq , a contradiction. Second, if kq  n, deﬁne v′ as the voting proﬁle
obtained from v by replacing each occurring q¯ by q. By monotonicity, the decision is f (v′) = p¯q, which is again ineﬃcient
for the type proﬁle t′ = v′ by Lemma 4 as nt′p = nvp  kp and nt′q = n kq , a contradiction.
Case 3: nvp < kp and n
v
q  kq . One can show that f (v) = p¯q like in Case 2.
Case 4: nvr < kr for each r ∈ {p,q}. We must show that f (v) = p¯q¯. By informative voting being eﬃcient and by Lemma 4
applied to t= v, f (v) ∈ {pq, p¯q¯}. Suppose for a contradiction that f (v) = pq. By (21), kr  n for some r ∈ {p,q}. We assume
that kp  n (the proof being analogous if kq  n). Let the voting proﬁle v′ ∈ J n arise from v by replacing each occurring p¯
by p. By monotonicity, f (v′) = pq. This outcome is ineﬃcient for the type proﬁle t′ = v′ by Lemma 4 and nt′p = n kp and
nt
′
q = nvq < kq . 
Proof of Theorem 7. A. First, let informative voting be sincere. Equivalently, for any type t ∈J , (*) E(u(d, S)|t) is maximal at
d = t . Using (*) with t = pq, we have E(u(pq, S)|t) E(u(p¯q, S)|t), which by Lemma 3 is equivalent to Pr(pq|t)+ Pr(p¯q¯|t)


































































Firstly, (i) πq1−πq 
1−aq¯
aq
, since otherwise by (22) we would get πp1−πp 
1−ap¯
ap
(< 1), whereas by (24) we get πp1−πp 
ap¯
1−ap
(> 1), a contradiction. Secondly, (ii) πp1−πp 
1−ap¯
ap
, because if (i) holds with a strict inequality, then (ii) follows from (22),
whereas if (i) holds with equality, then πq1−πq < 1 <
aq¯








1−aq . First, suppose (ii) holds with equality. Then
πp
1−πp < 1 <
ap¯
1−ap , which implies (iii), and
with (25) also implies (iv). Second, suppose (ii) holds with a strict inequality. Then with (23) we get (iv). If (iv) holds with
a strict inequality, then we get (iii) by (25), while if (iv) holds with equality, then 1−πqπq =
1−aq
aq¯
< 1 < aq1−aq¯ , which by (24)
implies (iii).





for each r ∈ {p,q}. We have to show that informative voting is sincere, i.e.,
that (*) holds for each type t ∈ J . As one can check, the inequalities (22)–(25) all hold. These inequalities imply that (*)
holds for each type t ∈J . For instance, as shown in part A, (22) reduces to E(u(pq, S)|t) E(u(p¯q, S)|t) for t = pq. 
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We begin by a simple lemma, the counterpart of Lemmas 1 and 3.






Pr(pq) if d = pq
1− Pr(pq) if d = pq,
and the conditional expected utility of d given a type or a type proﬁle is given by the analogous expression with conditional probabilities
instead of unconditional ones.
Proof. The claim follows from the speciﬁcation of the utility function. 
We now prove our results about the current preferences. Some proofs implicitly extend β(k, l) to values of k.l not in
{0, . . . ,n}, using the expression (5).
Proof of Proposition 1. The claim can easily be shown by elaborating the informal argument given in the text. 
Proof of Theorem 4. A. First, suppose f : J n → J is a quota rule with thresholds mp and mq making informative voting
eﬃcient. The following claims must be shown.
Claim 1.mp = lp and mq = lq .
Consider a type proﬁle t ∈J n for which ntp = n and ntq = lq . Assuming informative voting, the resulting voting proﬁle is
v = t. By deﬁnition of lq , β(n, lq) > 1/2. So f (v) = pq by Proposition 1. Thus, lq mq by deﬁnition of f . One analogously
shows that lp  mp . To show the converse inequalities, consider a voting proﬁle v ∈ J n for which nvp = mp and nvq = n
( mq). The resulting decision is f (v) = pq by deﬁnition of f . So, by Proposition 1, β(nvp,nvq) = β(mp,n) > 1/2. Hence,
mp  lp by deﬁnition of lp . Analogously, one shows that mq  lq .
Claim 2. β(lp, lq) > 1/2.
For any voting proﬁle v ∈J n for which nvp = lp (=mp) and nvq = lq (=mq), we have f (v) = pq by deﬁnition of f , so that
by Proposition 1 β(nvp,n
v
q) > 1/2, i.e., β(lp, lq) > 1/2.
B. Conversely, assume β(lp, lq) > 1/2. We show that the quota rule f with thresholds lp and lq makes informative voting
eﬃcient. We ﬁrst prove that for all k, l ∈ {0, . . . ,n},
β(k, l) > 1/2 ⇔ [k lp and l lq]. (26)
Let k, l ∈ {0, . . . ,n}. If k lp and l lq , then β(k, l) β(lp, lq) > 1/2, where the ﬁrst inequality holds because β is increasing
in each argument. If k < lp , then β(k, l) β(k,n) 1/2, where the last inequality holds by deﬁnition of lp (> k). Analogously,
if l lq , then β(k, l) 1/2.
Now consider any type proﬁle t ∈ J n . Assuming informative voting, the resulting voting proﬁle is v = t. We have to
show that the decision f (v) is eﬃcient for t (= v). First, if ntp  lp and ntq  lq , the decision is f (v) = pq, which is eﬃcient
by Proposition 1 since β(ntp,n
t
q) > 1/2 by (26). Second, if n
t
p < lp or n
t
q < lq , the resulting decision f (v) is in {p¯q, pq¯, p¯q¯},
which is eﬃcient by Proposition 1 since β(ntp,n
t
q) 1/2 by (26). 
Proof of Theorem 5. Consider a rule f : J n → J . We repeatedly draw on the fact that (*) β(k, l) is strictly increasing in
each argument.
A. First, assume f is deﬁned by (8) for thresholds mp and mq satisfying β(mp, lq), β(lp,mq) > 1/2. Clearly, f is anony-
mous. To show that informative voting is eﬃcient, it suﬃces by Proposition 1 to prove that for all v ∈J n ,
f (v) = pq ⇔ β(nvp,nvq)> 1/2. (27)
If β(nvp,n
v
q) > 1/2, then clearly f (v) = pq by (8). Conversely, assume f (v) = pq. Then, by deﬁnition of f , either nvr mr
for each r ∈ {p,q}, or β(nvp,nvq) > 1/2. In the second case, we are done. Now assume the ﬁrst case. Since β(mp, lq) > 1/2,
we have β(mp,n) > 1/2 by (*), whence mp  lp by deﬁnition of lp . Using (*) and that nvp mp  lp and nvq mq , we have
β(nvp,n
v
q) β(lp,mq). Moreover, β(lp,mq) > 1/2 by deﬁnition of mq . So, β(nvp,nvq) > 1/2, which completes the proof of (27).
It remains to show monotonicity of f . Take two voting proﬁles v,v′ ∈J n such that for all r ∈ f (v), the voters who vote
for r in v also vote for r in v′ .





q ) > 1/2, so that f (v
′) = pq by (27).














Since f (v) = pq¯, the deﬁnition of f implies nvp mp and nvq < mq , and the deﬁnition of v′ implies nv′p  nvp and nv′q  nvq;
hence, the ﬁrst two inequalities in (28) hold. As β(mp, lq) > 1/2 and nvp mp , we have β(nvp, lq) > 1/2 by (*). Also, since
f (v) = pq¯, we have β(nvp,nvq) 1/2 by (27). Hence, β(nvp,nvq) < β(nvp, lq). So, nvq < lq by (*), whence nv′q < lq as nv′q  nvq . Thus,
by deﬁnition of lq , β(n,nv
′




q ) 1/2 by (*), proving (28).
Case 3: f (v) = p¯q. One can show that f (v′) = p¯q analogously to Case 2.
Case 4: f (v) = p¯q¯. Then, nvp <mp , nvq <mq , and β(nvp,nvq) 1/2. We have to show that f (v′) = p¯q¯, i.e., that these three
inequalities still hold if v is replaced by v′ . This follows from the fact that nv′p  nvp and nv
′
q  nvq (by deﬁnition of v′) and
from (*).
B. Conversely, let f be monotonic and anonymous, and make informative voting eﬃcient. For each r ∈ {p,q}, deﬁne
mr := min
{









where this minimum is interpreted as n + 1 if it is taken over an empty set. We prove that f has the required form with
respect to the so-deﬁned thresholds mp and mq . The proof proceeds in several steps and is completed by Claims 5 and 6
below.
Claim 1. For all v ∈J n, if nvp  lp , nvq  lq and β(nvp,nvq) 1/2, then f (v) = p¯q¯.
Let v ∈ J n satisfy the antecedent condition. First assume f (v) = pq¯ for a contradiction. Let v′ be the voting proﬁle





q ) = β(n,nvq) β(n, lq) > 1/2 (where the ﬁrst inequality holds by nvq  lq , and the second by deﬁnition of lq).
This contradiction proves that f (v) = pq¯. One similarly proves that f (v) = p¯q. So, as f (v) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q, p¯q¯} by Proposition 1,
we have f (v) = p¯q¯, proving the claim.
Claim 2. For all v ∈J n, if nvp  lp , nvq  lq and β(lp, lq) 1/2, then f (v) = p¯q¯.
Consider any v ∈ J n satisfying the antecedent condition. Let w ∈ J n arise from v by replacing lp − nvp occurrences of
p¯ by p, lq − nvq occurrences of q¯ by q. Note that nwp = lp and nwq = lq , whence by Claim 1 f (w) = p¯q¯. By monotonicity, it
follows that f (v) = p¯q¯.
Claim 3.mp  lp and mq  lq .
Suppose for a contradiction mp < lp . By deﬁnition of mp , there is a v ∈J n such that mp = nvp , f p(v) = p and β(nvp,nvq)
1/2. As by Proposition 1, f (v) ∈ {p¯q, pq¯, p¯q¯}, it follows that f (v) = pq¯. We consider two cases.
Case 1: nvq  lq . Let v′ ∈ J n be the voting proﬁle arising from v by replacing each p¯ by p. By monotonicity, the resulting
decision is f (v′) = pq¯. But f (v′) = pq by Proposition 1 as β(nv′p ,nv′q ) = β(n,nvq) β(n, lq) > 1/2 (where the ﬁrst inequality
holds by nvq > lq and the second by deﬁnition of lq).
Case 2: nvq < lq . Then by Claim 2 f (v) = p¯q¯, a contradiction since f (v) = pq¯.
We have shown one inequality of Claim 3; the other one has an analogous proof.
Claim 4. For all v ∈J n with β(nvp,nvq) 1/2, if nvp mp then f (v) = pq¯, and if nvq mq then f (v) = p¯q.
Consider any v ∈J n with β(nvp,nvq) 1/2. Suppose for a contradiction that nvp mp but f (v) = pq¯. Then, as by Proposi-
tion 1 f (v) ∈ {p¯q, pq¯, p¯q¯}, either f (v) = p¯q or f (v) = p¯q¯.
Case 1: f (v) = p¯q. Let v′ ∈J n be the voting proﬁle arising from v by replacing each q¯ by q. By monotonicity, the resulting
decision is f (v′) = p¯q, whereas by Proposition 1 f (v′) = pq because β(nv′p ,nv′q ) = β(nvp,n) β(lp,n) > 1/2, where the ﬁrst
inequality holds because nvp  lp (by Claim 3) and the second inequality holds by deﬁnition of lp .
Case 2: f (v) = p¯q¯. By deﬁnition of mp there is a w ∈ J n such that nwp = mp , f p(w) = p and β(nwp ,nwq )  1/2. As by
Proposition 1 f (w) ∈ {pq¯, p¯q, p¯q¯}, it follows that f (w) = pq¯. Let v′ [w′] be the voting proﬁle arising from v [w] by replacing
each q by q¯. By monotonicity, f (v′) = p¯q¯ and f (w′) = pq¯. Now let w′′ be a voting proﬁle arising from w′ by replacing
nv
′
p − nw′p (= nvp − mp  0) occurrences of p¯ by p. By monotonicity, f (w′′) = pq¯. So, f (w′′) = f (v′), a contradiction by
anonymity since w′′ is a permutation of v′ .
This shows the ﬁrst implication in Claim 4. The second one can be shown similarly.
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We only show that β(mp, lq) > 1/2; the other inequality is analogous. Suppose for a contradiction that β(mp, lq) 1/2.
So, since β(n + 1, lq) > β(n, lq) > 1/2 (by deﬁnition of lq), we have mp = n + 1. Hence, there is a v ∈ J n such that nvp =mp
and nvq = lq . By Claim 4, f (v) = pq¯. Let v′ be the voting proﬁle arising from v by replacing each p¯ by p. By monotonicity,
f (v′) = pq¯, a contradiction since by Proposition 1 f (v′) = pq since β(nv′p ,nv′q ) = β(n, lq) > 1/2.
Claim 6. f is given by (8).
Consider any v ∈J n and r ∈ {p,q}. We show the equivalence (8) by distinguishing different cases. If β(nvp,nvq) > 1/2, then
f (v) = pq by Proposition 1, implying (8). If β(nvp,nvq) 1/2 and nvr mr , then (8) holds by Claim 4. Finally, if β(nvp,nvq) 1/2
and nvr <mr , then fr(v) = r by deﬁnition of mr , whence (8) again holds. 
Proof of Theorem 8. A. First, suppose informative voting is sincere. Equivalently, for any given type t ∈ J , the decision
d = t has maximal conditional expected utility, i.e., (*) E(u(d, S)|t) is maximal at d = t . Applying (*) with t = pq, we have
E(u(pq, S)|t)  E(u(p¯q¯, S)|t), which by Lemma 5 reduces to Pr(pq|t)  1 − Pr(pq|t), i.e., to Pr(pq|t)  1/2. Using (12),
one derives that πp1−πp ×
πq
1−πq  C . Now applying (*) with t = pq¯, we have E(u(pq¯, S)|t) E(u(pq, S)|t), which by Lemma 5
reduces to 1−Pr(pq|t) Pr(pq|t), so that Pr(pq|t) 1/2. Using (13), one obtains πp1−πp ×
πq
1−πq  A. Finally, applying (*) with
t = p¯q, we have E(u(p¯q, S)|t) E(u(pq, S)|t), which by Lemma 5 reduces to 1−Pr(pq|t) Pr(pq|t), whence Pr(pq|t) 1/2.
Using (14), one derives πp1−πp ×
πq
1−πq  B . This proves all inequalities.
B. Conversely, suppose A, B  πp1−πp ×
πq
1−πq  C . For each given type t ∈ J , one has to show (*). As the reader can
verify using Lemma 5 and (12)–(15), if t = pq then (*) follows from πp1−πp ×
πq













or from B  πp1−πp ×
πq
1−πq . 
B.6. An arbitrary number of issues
In this subsection, we assume the generalized model of Appendix A, with m (∈ {1,2,3, . . . , }) issues. To prove Theorem 9,
we begin with a lemma. As in the two-issue case, we write ‘S ’ for the random variable generating the state, and ntr for the
number of types in type proﬁle t (∈ J nm) which contain proposition r (∈ {p1, p¯1, . . . , pm, p¯m}). This latter notation can also
be used with a voting proﬁle v instead of a type proﬁle t.









r (1− ar)n−ntr . (29)
Proof. Assume simple preferences and consider any t ∈J nm . One easily shows that for all d ∈Jm
E
(







This implies the claimed equivalence. 
Proof of Theorem 9. Consider a voting rule f :J nm →Jm .
A. First, assume that f is the quota rule with thresholds kp1 , . . . ,kpm . Take any type proﬁle t and suppose informative
voting. Then the resulting voting proﬁle is v = t. We show that d := f (v) is the only eﬃcient decision for t, i.e., that (*)
E(u(d, S)|t) > E(u(d′, S)|t) for all d′ ∈Jm \ {d}. For all issues j, if p j ∈ d, then nvp j = ntp j  kp j , so that by (11)
πp ja
ntp j
p j (1− ap j )
n−ntp j > πp¯ j a
n−ntp j
p¯ j
(1− ap¯ j )
ntp j ,
or in other words (since n− ntp j = ntp¯ j )
πp ja
ntp j
p j (1− ap j )
n−ntp j > πp¯ j a
ntp¯ j
p¯ j
(1− ap¯ j )
n−ntp¯ j ;
while if p¯ j ∈ d, then nv = nt < kp j , so that by (11)p¯ j p¯ j
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ntp j
p j (1− ap j )
n−ntp j < πp¯ j a
n−ntp j
p¯ j






(1− ap¯ j )
n−ntp¯ j > πp ja
ntp j
p j (1− ap j )
n−ntp j .
In summary, for all r ∈ d (whether of the form p j or p¯ j), we have
πra
ntr















r (1− ar)n−ntr ,
i.e., E(u(d, S)|t) > E(u(d′, S)|t) by Lemma 6. This proves (*).
B. Now suppose informative voting is eﬃcient under f . Consider any voting proﬁle v ∈ J nm and issue j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}; we
must show that (**) p j ∈ f (v) if and only if nvp j  kp j . Since informative voting is eﬃcient, d := f (v) is eﬃcient for the type
proﬁle t := v. In fact, d is the only eﬃcient decision for t by our ‘no ties’ assumption. So, any other decision d′ ∈ Jm\{d}









r (1− ar)n−ntr .
If we apply this inequality to the case that d′ differs from d only on the jth issue (i.e., d  d′ = {p j, p¯ j}), then after
cancellation the inequality simpliﬁes to
πp ja
ntp j
p j (1− ap j )
n−ntp j > (<)πp¯ j a
ntp¯ j
p¯ j
(1− ap¯ j )
n−ntp¯ j if p j ∈ (/∈)d.
After replacing ntp¯ j by n− ntp j on the right hand side, it follows that
πp ja
ntp j
p j (1− ap j )
n−ntp j > πp¯ j a
n−ntp j
p¯ j
(1− ap¯ j )
ntp j ⇔ p j ∈ d.
This entails (**), since by (11) the left hand side of this equivalence holds if and only if ntp j  kp j , where t= v. 









πr(1− ar) + πr¯ar¯ (30)
Based on this expression, it is straightforward to generalize our earlier proof for the two-issue case (Theorem 6) to the
current m-issue case. 
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